

Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
L-03 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 DHA-05 IO-13 /076 W
-----112524 301331Z /43

O 301109Z AUG 77

FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0562

INFO AMEMBASSY DARESSALAAM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY PAPUTO

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GABORONE 2059

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDEV RH UK US BC

SUBJECT: GOB VIEWS ON LUSAKA MEETING

1. SUMMARY: EXTAFFMIN ARCHIE MOGWE TOLD ME AT SOCIAL FUNCTION AUGUST 27, SEVERAL HOURS AFTER RETURNING FROM LUSAKA, THAT PRESIDENT MACHEL'S CALL THERE FOR "A NEUTRAL ARMY" HAD CREATED A GREAT OPPORTUNITY THAT HAD BEEN MISSED. HE SAID FONSEC OWEN NOT ONLY IGNORED THE OPENING, HE INSISTED ON RETURNING THE DISCUSSION TO THE NEED TO ASSURE A ROLE FOR RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY. MOGWE SAID HE INTENDED TO CONVEY HIS VIEWS TO UK HIGH COMMISSIONER AND WOULD CALL US BOTH IN ON AUGUST 29. THIS HE DID AND, FOR NEARLY AN HOUR, REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF THE LUSAKA MEETING AS THEY APPEARED TO GOB DEL. THE HIGHLIGHT OF HIS REVIEW WAS HIS REQUEST THAT WE COMMUNICATE TO FONSEC OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG GOB VIEW THAT IT WAS NOT TOO LATE TO EXPLORE THE OPENING CRATED BY MACHEL'S CALL FOR "A NEUTRAL ARMY". END SUMMARY.

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2. EXTAFFMIN MOGWE CALLED ME AUGUST 29 AFTER MORNING CABINET MEETINGS AND BWTWEEN PARLIAMENT SITTINGS TO GIVE UK HICOM AND ME HIS REACTION TO LUSAKA MEETINGS. PRESIDENTIAL PRIVATE SECRETARY JOE LEGWAILA JOINED US ABOUT MIDWAY IN OUR ONE-HOUR TALK. MOGWE'S PURPOSE IN MEETING WITH US WAS CLEARLY TO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT

THE OPENING PRESENTED BY PRESIDENT MACHEL'S CALL FOR
"A NEUTRAL ARMY" HAD NOT BEEN PURSUED. MOGWE HOPED IT
WAS NOT TOO LATE TO DO SO AND SPECIFICALLY URGED THAT HIS
VIEWS BE CONVEYED TO FONSEC OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG.

3. IN REVIEWING THE SEQUENCE OF MEETINGS AUGUST 26 AND 27
AT LUSAKA, MOGWE REFERRED POINTEDLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS
TO FONSEC OWEN'S CONCERN WITH THE NEED TO "REASSURE
RHODESIAN WHITES". THE REAL HITCH CAME, MOGWE SAID, IN
DISCUSSING THE FUTURE OF THE ARMIES. WHEN OWEN
SUGGESTED THAT "SOME OF SMITH'S ARMY" COULD BE
INTEGRATED INTO ZIMBABWEAN ARMY DISPIE FACT SMITH'S FORCES
WERE REGARDED AS "REBELS", THE PRESIDENTS WERE
"UNHAPPY". SPEAKING FOR FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS, NYERERE HAD SAID
THAT THE FRONT-LINE AGREED TO RETAIN THE RHODESIAN PUBLIC (CIVIL)
SERVICE AND RHODESIAN POLICE TO TAKE SMITH'S ARMY AS WELL WOULD
BE "TOO MUCH". IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT, ACCORDING TO MOGWE, THAT
PRESIDENT MACHEL SUMMARIZED SITUATION AS FOLLOWS: "WE ARE TALKING
ABOUT A LIBERATION STRUGGLE WHICH NO ONE HAS WON AND
NO ONE HAS LOST. IF THE STRUGGLE SHOULD CONTINUE FOR
20 YEARS, THE LIBERATION FORCES WOULD WIN. WHAT WE
SHOULD SEEK IS A NEUTRAL ARMY." MOGWE SAID HE FELT
A SURGE A EXCITEMENT AT THIS UNPRECEDENTED OPENING AND
HOPED SOMEONE WOULD PURSUE IT. INSTEAD, HE SAID, OWEN
REITERATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT RETAINING SMITH'S FORCES AS
ASSURANCE TO WHITES AND REPORTEDLY COMMENTED IN EFFECT
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THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO "AGREE TO DISAGREE". MOGWE FELT
STRONGLY THAT IT WAS NOT TOO LATE TO PURSUE THIS POINT AND
OUTLINED (WITH LEGWAILA'S ASSISTANCE) THE GOB ARGUMENTS AS FOLLOWS.

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FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
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AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GABORONE 2059

4. FIRST, HE SAID, MACHEL'S CALL FOR A NEUTRAL ARMY WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT OPENED THE WAY FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT WAS MEANT BY A NEUTRAL ARMY. WHO WOULD QUALIFY AS NEUTRAL? WHAT WOULD THE NUCLEUS OF SUCH AN ARMY BE? SECOND, THIS QUESTIONING WOULD REVEAL THAT "THE TWO PATRIOTIC FRONT ARMIES" COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED NEUTRAL AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE DEMOBILIZED. THIRD, THIS WOULD LEAD TO AN EXAMINATION OF "THE OTHER TWO ARMIES", I.E., SMITH'S ARMY, WITH EXCEPTION OF "CLEARLY UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS", AND "NYERERE'S ARMY". THIS COULD BEGIN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR SCREENING ELEMENTS OF SMITH'S ARMY THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. IT ALSO MIGHT TURN OUT THAT "NYERERE'S ARMY" WOULD BE REGARDED AS NEUTRAL -- AND THEREFORE THE NUCLEUS OF THE NEW ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. FOURTH, IF MUGABE AND NKOMO ARMIES ARE JUDGED NOT BE NEUTRAL AND REFUSE TO DEMOBILIZE, FRONTLINE STATES COULD DENY THEM RECOGNITION AND EVENTUALLY REFUSE USE OF BASES ON THEIR TERRITORY AND ALSO BEGIN TO CHANNEL ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE "NEUTRAL" CONFIDENTIAL

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FORCES WHOSE SOLE ALLEGIANCE WOULD BE TO INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. MOGWE COMMENTED THAT FOUR OF THE FRONTLINE STATES EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR MACHEL'S CALL FOR "A NEUTRAL ARMY"; ONLY PRESIDENT KAUNDA WITHHELD APPROVAL. THIS SUPPORT, IF AFFIRMED, COULD BE THE BASIS FOR BUILDING A TRUE ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. FIFTH, MOGWE SAID MACHEL'S SUGGESTION ALSO REPRESENTED A STEP BACK FROM HIS PREVIOUS ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR MUGABE; THIS WAS ANOTHER REASON TO PURSUE THE POINT. FINALLY, MOGWE SAID HIS "GREATEST FEAR" IS THAT MUGABE AND NKOMO WILL GET WIND OF THE CALL FOR A NEUTRAL ARMY, THAT THEY WILL HASTILY EXCHANGE A NUMBER OF COMMANDERS AND/OR ADVISERS AND TRY TO PRESENT THEMSELVES AS THE NEUTRAL FORCE. IN FACT, THEY HAD DONE NOTHING SINCE JANUARY TO UNIFY; THEIR RIVALRY CONTINUED, THEY COULD NOT BE TRUSTED TO UNITE. MOGWE NOTED THAT BOTH NKOMO AND MUGABE HAD BEEN INVITED TO ADDRESS THE "NYERERE ARMY" IN THEIR CAMPS IN TANZANIA. MUGABE'S RIGID IDEOLOGICAL REMARKS HAD TURNED OFF "THE TROOPS" AND NKOMO WAS MUCH MORE WARMLY APPLAUDED.

5. IN COMMENTING ON GOB VIEWS, UK HICOM SAID UK POLICY (AS RECEIVED BY HIM HERE) WAS TO LEAVE TO THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER THE QUESTION OF COMPOSITION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. HE UNDERSTOOD THE RESCOM WOULD "INHERIT" ALL THE ARMIES AND, IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHERS SUCH AS UN RES REP, DECIDE WHO WOULD CONSTITUTE THE ZIMBABWE ARMY. MOGWE RETORTED THAT IT COULD ONLY HELP THE RESREP IF IT COULD BE DECIDED "IN IRINCIPLE" WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE "A NEUTRAL ARMY" OR ITS NUCLEUS. MOGWE SAID THE GOB'S SCENARIO WAS FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH PRIMIN CALLAGHAN'S LETTER STATING THAT ZIMBABWE ARMY WOULD BE "BASED UPON LIBERATION FORCES". MY UK COLLEAGUE REITERATED THAT IT WAS "UK POSITION" THAT IT WAS THE RESCOM'S TASK TO DECIDE WHO WOULD BE IN THE ARMY; MOGWE AND LEGWAILA INSISTED THAT PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE.

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6. MOGWE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT GOB WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE RESULTS OF PRIVATE MEETINGS LATE IN THE DAY OF AUGUST 27 INVOLVING FONSEC OWEN, AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND PRES. KAUNDA. HE NOTED THAT KAUNDA WAS IN A TESTY MOOD, HAVING LOST HIS TEMPER LISTENING TO OWEN. KK APPARENTLY SAID "THE WEST IS NOT SERIOUS", THAT IT "FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES" IN ITS REITERATED CONCERN ABOUT PRESERVING THE ROLE AND PRIVILEGES OF THE WHITES.

7. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, MOGWE SAID IT WOULD BE "CARRYING TO TOO FAR AT THIS TIME" TO SAY THAT FOUR OF THE FIVE FRONTLINE STATES WERE FAVORABLE TO THE CONCEPT OF A "NEUTRAL ARMY". HE COULD ONLY SAY THAT FOUR OF THE FIVE SPOKE OUT IN FAVOR OF IT AT THE TIME AND THAT THE OPPORTUNITY WAS STILL THERE TO BE EXPLORED. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH MOGWE REPEATING HIS HOPE THAT HIS VIEWS, WHICH GOB APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY, COULD BE CONVEYED TO FONSEC OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: IN VIEW OF EVIDENT DEEP CONCERN HERE ON THIS POINT, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO HAVE ANY REACTION I COULD CARRY TO MOGWE -- AND PERHAPS TO PRES. KHAMA. (KHAMA TOLD BE AUGUST 27 HE PLANNED TO E HERE UNTIL SEPTEMBER 12.) OUR DIALOGUE ON ANGLO-AMERICAN INITIATIVE WOULD BE GREATLY FACILITATED BY CANDID COMMENT ON POINTS RAISED HEREIN.
NORLAND

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Message Attributes

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